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John Gardner has noted that legal positivism is more a theory of legal validity 
than it is a theory about law’s nature.1 This is true in that one can be a legal 
positivist and hold a variety of different theories about law’s nature, but not to 
the extent that ‘anything goes’ ontologically speaking. Rather, it seems fairly 
difficult to be a legal positivist and not say that the law is a kind of social fact. 
That being said, however, there are a variety of ways of creating social facts 
so there is some room for disagreement when it comes to the nature of law 
within the wide umbrella of legal positivism. If our focus is legal validity, then 
we may not have too much reason to wade into these deeper metaphysical 
waters. However, I believe that legal positivism has a challenge that is not (as) 
present in other theories of law – the problem of explaining law’s normativity. I 
contend that one of the best hopes for meeting this challenge is to be found in 
getting more clarity about what it is that yields these special social facts, 
although I remain open to the possibility that the challenge can also be met in 
other ways. 
Let us first get a bit more clarity on the challenge itself, then we will see how 
settling the metaphysical questions about law can help to meet the challenge, 
and then I can suggest how my preferred answer to the metaphysical questions 
meets the challenge. 
The challenge is a version of the age-old problem identified perhaps most 
clearly by David Hume: that one cannot reason from a set of merely descriptive 
                                       
1 John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 33. 
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factual premises to a conclusion that contains a normative claim.2 If we accept 
that law is a social fact, then it would seem to be a descriptive fact without a 
clear normative implication. Consider the following argument: 
P1. Some guys in Washington, DC back in 1954 wrote a lengthy 
document some part of which contained a clause specifying that 
citizens and residents of the United States file and pay their taxes by 
April 15 of each year. 
P2. When asked to show their assent to this document, a majority of 
people in the room at the time said ‘aye’. This happened twice, once 
on each side of the building. 
P3. This document was then sent up the street where another guy 
signed it. 
∴ I [as a U.S. citizen] ought to file and pay taxes by April 15 of each year. 
Before we get into the details of this argument and how to tighten it up a 
bit, we should notice one thing about the obvious gap and what Hume was 
saying. We need not conclude that the normative conclusion is incapable of 
having a truth-value merely because one is not entitled to draw it from non-
normative facts. Hume’s point was merely that normative conclusions (which 
might still be true or false, unless one accepts a meta-normative theory 
denying this) are of a different kind from non-normative facts. Hence, one 
cannot reason from the non-normative to the normative. There are no ‘oughts’, 
‘shoulds’, or other analogs in the premises, so we cannot soundly offer a 
conclusion that contains one. 
                                       
2 Treatise of Human Nature Bk. III, Pt.1, sec.1. 
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The problem we will tackle here is therefore not how to justify a given 
normative conclusion from merely descriptive premises about the law, but how 
we are even entitled to expect such a justification. In other words, the problem 
is what makes a robust normative conclusion truth-apt, given an argument 
that apparently only has descriptive premises. Put another way, we can see 
Hume’s point as saying that there is a category mistake in reasoning from 
merely descriptive premises to a normative conclusion: Even if the normative 
conclusion can have a truth value, the kind of truth it contains is different than 
the kind of truth contained in the premises. Hence one cannot reason from 
descriptive kinds of premises to normative kinds of conclusions. So our task is 
not here to justify that one ought or ought not to follow the law. Rather, we are 
trying to discover how it is even possible for such conclusions to be of the right 
kind given the apparently merely descriptive premises. To do so we must deny 
that there is a Humean category mistake in such arguments about the law. 
And to support that denial we must investigate the metaphysics of the law to 
show where normativity creeps into the otherwise merely descriptive premises. 
Now clearly, before we can even begin to examine this argument as an 
instance of legal reasoning, we must get the idea of law into the argument 
somehow. The descriptions in the three premises are non-legal descriptions of 
events that have legal consequences within a system of law already in place. So 
a more precise option would be to set out the descriptions of prior events that 
make it the case that these events specify a legal outcome. We would have to 
say that there was a foundational document adopted by the original state 
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legislatures, specifying the composition and procedures of the bodies on the 
two sides of that building; that the guys saying ‘aye’ on each side of the 
building were themselves picked out by a selection procedure in each state 
consistent with the foundational documents of those states and of the over-
arching foundational document adopted by the original states; that the guy up 
the street signing the document was himself picked out by a selection 
procedure specified within that foundational document; that the content of the 
document to which they were saying ‘aye’ was itself consistent with the 
foundational document adopted by the original states; etc. But for ease of 
treatment let us boil all this down and just add a fourth premise: 
P4. These events constituted a law in the United States. 
The status of this particular premise is somewhat more opaque, especially 
as it deploys the very concept that we are primarily worried about, LAW. But the 
point of this exercise is to inquire into the propriety of reaching a normative 
conclusion from legal premises, so it will have to be in there somehow. We will 
also shortly see that the question of whether this premise is entirely non-
normative is precisely what separates legal positivists from the anti-positivists. 
We might also be wondering a bit about this ‘constituted’ relation, a point we 
will return to a bit later. 
First, however, let us get something more explicitly normative into our 
argument: 
P5. Legally, I ought to pay my taxes by April 15 of each year. 
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I say that this is explicitly normative because it uses an ‘ought’ term, but that 
normativity might be misleading or of the wrong kind to justify the more basic 
conclusion that I ought to pay my taxes by April 15 of each year. Instead, this 
is a contextually bound claim that may or may not have more basic normative 
consequences. So while there is an ‘ought’ in the statement, it may not get us 
where we need to be. According to legal positivism, a legal requirement is still a 
matter of descriptive fact about the legal system even if it is a conclusion of the 
social fact premises.  
To be more precise, there is some dispute among legal positivists about 
whether legal normativity is a special context-dependent form of normativity, or 
if it represents instead a kind of assertion about our moral obligations. H.L.A. 
Hart held the first view and Joseph Raz holds the second.3 Under Hart’s view, 
the Humean problem is avoided by stipulation. That is, instead of the 
conclusion we are discussing here, we simply stick ‘legally’ in front of it, 
thereby substituting P5 for the conclusion, and our work is done. We are 
entitled to the new conclusion because, while it uses normative terminology, its 
truth is merely a matter of the descriptive facts that came before. What one 
legally ought to do is entirely exhausted by the social facts that determine the 
law – if the law says to pay your taxes by April 15, then that is what one legally 
ought to do. What one ought to do tout court is simply not at issue until we get 
                                       
3 H L A Hart, Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford, Clarendon Press 
1982) 159-60, Joseph Raz, ‘Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties’ (1984) 4 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 123, 130-31. See also Kenneth Einar Himma, ‘The Ties That Bind: An Analysis of 
the Concept of Obligation’ (2013) 26 Ratio Juris 16, 18-19. 
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into a wider theory of political obligation. Law’s normativity is therefore 
artificial in both senses of the word. 
While that is certainly one way out of this particular conundrum, I’ll follow 
Raz’s view because of the interesting problem that it leaves open: how to justify 
the move from mere descriptive facts to a robust normative conclusion.4 That 
is, the ‘legally’ qualifier, places the normative claim in a special context such 
that it becomes a descriptive fact about the legal system in question and not a 
normative claim about what I ought to do. So we still need an argument to strip 
the ‘legally’ qualifier from the normative statement. Under this view we can 
either see P5 as an additional premise on its own, or as a nested conclusion 
reached from the prior premises but still antecedent to the more basic 
normative claim made in the main conclusion. 
Anti-positivists such as natural lawyers have another easy way out of the 
problem. Natural law can be understood to add two premises:  
NLP1. Law is an ordinance of reason.5 
NLP2. One should do what the balance of reasons dictates.  
So we have a normative claim squarely in the premises. If we are comfortable 
with the additional premise that this particular law is not overly defective (in 
                                       
4 Raz himself answers this by specifying the legitimacy conditions for authority, seeing law as a 
paradigm case (although frequently illegitimate) of that authority. I’m trying to specify what 
kind of thing law must be in order for it to be possibly legitimately authoritative. The Hartian 
answer itself only pushes this problem back one step anyway. 
5 Thomas Aquinas, Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Treatise on Law : [Being Summa Theologiae, I-Ii; 
Qq. 90 through 97] (R J Henle tr, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1993 (c 1270)) Q 
90. 
Ehrenberg – Ontology and Reason Giving   8 
that it is not against the balance of reasons), we can get a decent argument for 
the conclusion. But we have to be satisfied with the premise that law is an 
ordinance of reason, linking practical reason to the non-defectiveness 
conditions of law itself. That is one metaphysical claim about the nature of law: 
that it is an ordinance of reason. And it is one way to offer a kind of solution to 
the problem. So in natural law we already find a metaphysical solution to the 
problem, just not one that legal positivists are comfortable accepting. If we 
aren’t comfortable with that particular metaphysical claim, believing instead 
perhaps that legality is entirely a creation of human beings and therefore 
exhausted by the social facts described in the original premises, then we still 
have to figure out some way of getting from ‘it’s a law’ and ‘legally, I ought to 
pay’ to ‘I ought to pay’.  
Now it may also be that the argument simply doesn’t go through. There are 
certainly circumstances in which I ought not to pay. The question isn’t what 
forces the truth of the conclusion unerringly, but rather what in the premises 
makes the conclusion truth-apt given that the nature of those facts is different 
in kind than the normative claim of the conclusion. The answer is to find 
normativity lurking elsewhere in the premises within the nature of law. That is, 
in an understanding of how those facts constitute law we will see the 
beginnings of a normative demand. 
If the goal, as just stated, is to discover what makes the conclusion truth-
apt, given the premises as originally conceived do not have any obviously 
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normative contents, then to reach the goal there would have to be something 
within those contents that hid some aspect of normativity. There would have to 
be something in the nature of the things referred to in the premises that would 
allow for normative conclusions to be drawn from facts about them. And here is 
the first suggestion that the solution must be metaphysical. If we are looking at 
the nature of the things described in the premises for our lurking normativity, 
we are asking for a more complete picture of the ontology of some aspect of 
what we are talking about. In the original premises P1-P3, the descriptions 
were fairly straightforward, although there might be some questions about 
‘United States’, ‘taxes’, and ‘assent’. But the really opaque part is in P4. We 
need to have greater clarity of what it is for a set of facts such as shown in P1-
P3 to ‘constitute a law’, as that is most likely the source of normativity that 
makes the original conclusion truth-apt. 
Let me be clear about something else. In accepting Raz’s picture of the 
nature of the normative demand that law makes, one might think that we can 
just follow Raz’s picture of authority generally and say that what legitimates 
the normative demand that law makes is whether it provides a better guide to 
the balance of reasons that apply to us than we would be able to discover 
and/or follow on our own.6 I am not adverse to this idea of authority but I need 
to make it clear that it is not quite the project that we set out on here. Raz has 
given us an analysis of what legitimates authority generally and then shows 
                                       
6 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986) 53. See also Kenneth M 
Ehrenberg, ‘Joseph Raz’s Theory of Authority’ (2011) 6 Philosophy Compass 884, 886. 
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how that analysis can be applied to law.7 The result is a picture of what 
conditions law would have to satisfy in order for its directives to be legitimate. 
That might at first blush appear to be a perfectly adequate answer to the task 
of validating the argument set out above. But above further investigation, we 
should see that it is not quite the same argument. Instead, we would have 
given an argument with a conclusion about when we should follow a legitimate 
authority and then perhaps given some premises about when legal directives 
meet those conditions for legitimate authority.  
Now it very well may be in the end that the only time we really should follow 
a legal directive is when it meets the conditions for legitimate authority. So 
maybe the only argument we should really be concerned with is the one over 
what legitimates an authoritative directive and how those conditions might be 
applied to law. But for better or worse, the task we have set ourselves above is 
what about the law itself makes a normative conclusion truth-apt, based on 
merely descriptive premises about the law. So the question is then what is it in 
the nature of the law that allows us even to entertain the propriety of reasoning 
from descriptive premises to a normative conclusion. Raz takes it as given that 
law could be legitimately authoritative (seeing it as a paradigm instance of 
authority).8 Our question here is what it is about law that makes it so. 
                                       
7 Joseph Raz, ‘Facing Up: A Reply’ (1989) 62 Southern California Law Review 1153, 1184. See 
also Ehrenberg, ‘Joseph Raz’s Theory of Authority’ 886. 
8 Joseph Raz, ‘Authority, Law and Morality’ (1985) 68 Monist 295, 302. 
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Remembering what exercised Hume about the is-ought problem also helps 
to see why the solution must be a metaphysical one. The question is not merely 
how we can know the truth of a normative conclusion where the premises are 
merely descriptive. Rather the question is how a truth of a different, normative, 
kind could be derived from merely descriptive premises. This calls for an 
investigation either into the nature of normativity generally, or (at least) one 
into the nature of the particular descriptive premises that supposedly ground 
the normative conclusion. So let us now turn to thinking a bit more about the 
relation between the descriptions in P1-P3 and P4. 
P1-P3 are descriptions of actions taken by a set of individuals over time. P4 
is a claim that these actions are to be understood as having created something 
that wasn’t in existence before those actions (or to have altered some aspect of 
what was there before). Given that the actions involved writing things down, 
showing assent to what was written, and then adding one’s name to the writing 
(we assume, after that person has read it), it does not seem too much of a 
stretch to say that these actions were intentional on the part of those who 
participated (or at least the vast majority of them).  
Some acts could be either intentional or non-intentional. I can decide to 
take a breath at a certain point in time, making an action that is usually not 
intentional into one that is intentional. It is also certainly true that not all 
human intentional action is necessarily goal-directed. I can intentionally start 
doodling on a pad of paper without having any goal in mind about the picture I 
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am trying to create. However, I would also say that the more interactive and 
collaborative an action is with others, the more it would appear necessary for it 
to be goal-directed. After all, if I am hoping that others will participate in the 
action with me, they will likely need reasons to do so. Their reasons might not 
be the same as mine. Indeed, everyone might participate with his or her own 
individual reason for doing so. But to say that it is interactive and collaborative 
is to say that the people participating likely share some conception of what it is 
that they are doing together. So, while their motivating reasons might be vastly 
different from one another, their understanding of the enterprise itself is likely 
to have some unified goal insofar as they understand with one another what it 
is that they are doing together. 
Given the descriptions we have in P1-P3, and the more complex description 
in P4, along with the idea that the people referred to are doing something 
together, it is not unreasonable to say that they are acting together in order to 
constitute the law as described in P4. (And if you do find this to be too much of 
a jump, I’m happy to include it as an additional premise – that the participants 
described in P1-P3 understood what they were doing was creating a law and 
acted in order to do that. After all, that addition is still clearly descriptive.) 
While to the extent that they are working together might suggest that they are 
merely engaging in some group activity (which they certainly are), the idea that 
their group activity is constituting something as described in P4 suggests that 
their activity is not merely goal-directed but productive. That is, their activity is 
changing or creating something.  
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Here I will help myself to a taxonomy first articulated (to my knowledge) by 
my former colleague Randall Dipert. Any materials the people in Washington 
used toward their goals could be called ‘instruments’. Materials that were 
specially adapted to serve their goals would be ‘tools’, while materials that were 
specially adapted to serve specific goals and to communicate that usage would 
be understood as ‘artefacts’.9 (Each of the last two of these categories is to be 
understood as a subset of the previous one.) If I pick up a rock from the ground 
and use it to smash open some nuts, I’m using the rock as an instrument. If I 
bang off some flakes of the rock to give it a smoother surface for better 
smashing those nuts, I’ve made a tool. And if I attach to it a handle and 
perhaps design special ridges specifically adapted to nut-cracking, then I’ve 
made an artefact.10  
Notice that one can recognize an artefact without knowing what precise 
usage it is meant to serve. However, the primary way we try to understand an 
artefact with which we are unfamiliar is by trying to discover what it is (or was) 
used for. 
When these guys in Washington wrote something down on paper and then 
polled their members for their assent (twice) and then sent the writing up the 
street for another guy to sign, each person was clearly acting with the intent 
that what they were doing would be understood as the creation of something 
                                       
9 Randall R Dipert, ‘Some Issues in the Theory of Artifacts: Defining “Artifact” and Related 
Notions’ (1995) 78 Monist 119, 121-29. 
10 There are obviously serious problems with individuating the particular goals that a designer 
might have in mind in making an artefact, but that need not worry us for the moment. 
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with normative implications. They wanted us to pay our taxes by April 15 each 
year and they thought that what they were doing would have the effect (among 
others) of creating a norm that we do so. Hence, what they were doing was 
creating a kind of tool that (they imagined) established a norm that United 
States residents pay their taxes by April 15 each year. But more than merely a 
tool, what they created also carried the signal to them and others that they 
thereby created that norm. Hence they created a kind of artefact, one function 
of which was to establish the norm that U.S. residents pay their taxes by April 
15 of each year.  
However, the fact that they created an artefact with the function of 
establishing this norm does not entail that the norm was successfully 
established. It is, of course, entirely possible to create an artefact with a 
function that cannot be fulfilled. I can create a perpetual motion machine, 
which will always be doomed to failure. Many smart people created machines 
the function of which was to fly before the Wright brothers finally made a 
successful one.11 
Yet, even if the particular norm that they wanted to create wasn’t thereby 
created, if they were successful in creating an artefact at all, then some 
normativity is thereby entailed by the fact of artefact creation. Amie Thomasson 
tells us that public artefacts (artefacts that are designed to be recognizable to 
                                       
11 There might be some debate about whether an artefact can have a function that it is doomed 
never to fulfill. But I leave this aside for now as clearly the artefact’s creators can intend for it 
to serve that function, which is generally enough to consider it an artefact. 
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people other than merely the creator) have ‘receptive’ features that signal how 
the object is to be used or treated.12 It is therefore this signaling feature of such 
artefacts that introduces the barest form of normativity into the otherwise 
completely descriptive account of what is going on. In the case of law, the norm 
being signaled generally may be simply that the norm putatively created by the 
legislation is being singled out for a special kind of social emphasis. 
Once again, even these barest norms of treatment conveyed by the signaling 
need not be normatively dispositive for action. One can have over-riding 
reasons to ignore the signals conveyed by the artefact. I can use the nut-
cracker as a doorstop, and I can see some laws a reasons for disobedience 
rather than reasons for compliance. Yet in each of these cases, my mere usage 
of these artefacts in other ways than those they were intended does not mean I 
stop recognizing them as the kind of artefact they are. My nut-cracker remains 
a nut-cracker, even when used as a doorstop. The point was to so show where 
and how normativity can arise within the otherwise descriptive claims in the 
premises of the argument, to show how the conclusion can be truth-apt even 
when based on descriptive premises.  
This signaling is precisely what opens up the possibility that the normativity 
created in making the artefact applies more broadly beyond those who are 
directly involved in its creation. Even theorists who are doubtful that law can 
create new norms beyond merely activating pre-existing conditional norms, 
                                       
12 Amie L Thomasson, ‘Public Artifacts, Intentions and Norms’ in Maarten Franssen and others 
(eds), Artefact Kinds: Ontology and the Human-Made World (Cham, Springer, 2013) 49. 
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such as David Enoch, accept that norms can be created through the 
communication of an intention to do so (such as me making a request of you, 
which communicates my intention that you see the request as a reason for 
complying with it).13 So if law is a public artefact and public artefacts consist 
(partially) in signaling that they be received by others as carrying normativity, 
then that signaling can be seen as the communicated intention to create a 
norm, at least of recognition.  
The implication here is that the most basic norm created when the artefact 
is created is that the artefact is one token of a type understood (here) in terms 
of the function the artefact is to perform. This is why the nut-cracker doesn’t 
stop being a nut-cracker when used as a doorstop. And I can understand that 
the point of the behavior of these guys in Washington is to put some special 
emphasis on a norm to pay taxes by April 15, even if I never comply. 
Now, even if you think that this might get us somewhere in the explanation 
of where normativity arises in our otherwise merely descriptive premises, you 
might be somewhat bothered by what appears to be a kind of circularity in this 
picture of the nature of law. That is, the intention communicated by the 
behavior of the guys in Washington is that I treat the result of their actions as 
a law – that is what is meant by that special social emphasis. The nut-cracker 
is still a nut-cracker even when repurposed; the law is still a law, even when 
broken. But that means these actions creating the artefact, constituting the 
                                       
13 David Enoch, ‘Reason-Giving and the Law’ in Leslie Green and Brian Leiter (eds), Oxford 
Studies in Philosophy of Law, Volume 1 (Oxford, Oxford Univ Press, 2011) 12-13. 
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law, are somehow self-defining. Normativity may have been created, but only 
by allowing the deus ex machina of this bootstrapping self-definition. 
Put another way, there appears to be an important distinction between the 
law and the nut-cracker. To create a nut-cracker, one must merely create an 
object with the purpose and structural ability to crack nuts, and which signals 
its usability for doing so. But to create a law, one follows a set of procedures 
that earlier people set forth for doing so (in more law that was pre-existing or 
that they created), thereby giving the status of law to what one does. The key to 
the law is its status and that status and its implications seem to have been 
created at some point out of nothing. 
The answer to this final problem lies in understanding the nature of an 
institution and how it creates and defines a special status. The law isn’t just 
any artefact, but rather is a specific kind of artefact – an institution. The 
special task of institutions is to create and alter ‘desire-independent reasons 
for action’.14 So the truth-aptness of a normative conclusion stemming from 
merely descriptive premises lies in whether those premises are describing the 
creation of an artefact generally, or the activation/creation of an institution 
specifically. 
As kinds of artefacts, but unlike other social forms like rituals or cultures, 
institutions are also self-consciously created. As a certain kind of public 
                                       
14 John R Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 23, 99. 
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artefact for manipulating norms, institutions are intentionally created social 
arrangements for pursuing certain ends by altering the normative relationship 
among those who are within or subject to the institution.  
Following John Searle’s influential theory of institutions, institutional facts 
are social facts about ‘status functions’ that are assigned to objects, people, 
events, practices, etc. by a specific group adopting a ‘constitutive rule’.15 Those 
statuses are understood to alter the normative relations among people in order 
to serve the purposes of those creating or using the institution. 
But the point of introducing institutions to this discussion for our purposes 
here is to try to answer the apparent problem of the self-defining nature of 
law’s special normative status. While physical artefacts like nut-crackers get 
their little bit of normativity from the intentions their creators have for them to 
serve and signal their particular functions, our guys in Washington are simply 
writing things down, saying ‘aye’, and signing their names. And that’s 
supposed to put a specific kind of special status on what they’ve done, giving 
us reasons for action.  
For this final piece of the puzzle, we must return to where we started at the 
very beginning: legal validity. On the first page I made much of the distinction 
between the metaphysics of law and legal validity, pointing out that legal 
positivists can disagree on the metaphysics of law while agreeing on a theory of 
                                       
15 Ibid 23-26, 40-45. The notion of ‘function’ in ‘status function’ is akin to the mathematical 
notion and should not be confused for the notion relevant for understanding artefacts more 
generally. 
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legal validity. But in order to give a metaphysical explanation of how 
normativity arises in law, I need to show where legal validity arises in my 
metaphysical picture since legal validity determines the contours of the 
normativity of law.  
To do this, I am going to help myself to another distinction made by Searle 
in his theory of institutions. Searle distinguishes between informal institutions 
and formal institutions. In the former, the special normative statuses 
(conveying ‘deontic powers’ to participants) are doled out case by case.16 That 
is, there are no formal rules for determining what counts as an instance of an 
informal institution. So those participating in that social arrangement must 
establish whether they are participating in an instance of the arrangement and 
the special rights, powers, and responsibilities entailed by it in each case. 
Cocktail parties are informal institutions in that each one must be understood 
as such, token by token.17 
In formal institutions, however, the constitutive rule is ‘codified’, specifying 
what features an instance must have to be counted as one of that type of 
institution.18 This notion of codification is Searle’s and is meant to be broader 
than the legal usage. But the idea is that by codifying a constitutive rule for the 
institution, we are giving specifications of what instances, actions, roles, 
enactments, writings, etc. are normatively valid by the institution’s own lights. 
                                       
16 Ibid 91. 
17 John R Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York, Free Press, 1995) 87-88. 
18 Ibid 5. 
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Codification is a formalized process of declaration for attaching, creating, or 
altering normatively laden statuses. 
Strictly speaking, the formal/informal distinction among institutions isn’t 
entirely necessary to solve the self-referentiality problem, but it helps to 
understand what is going on in arguments about law’s normativity. Recall that 
the self-referentiality problem arose because the institution defines its own 
statuses. To be a nut-cracker is to be designed and manufactured in such a 
way as to be primarily purposed to crack nuts and to signal that usage. To be 
cocktail party is to be treated as a cocktail party by participants, whatever that 
treatment might be for them. To be a law is to be created as a law, where the 
powers conveyed by being a law are set forth in further laws that determine 
which laws count as such. The two institutional cases display self-referentiality 
in that they are constituted by statuses that are self-defined: To be a cocktail 
party is to be treated as a cocktail party. To be a law is to be created as a law. 
But in these institutional cases the status named by (or of) the institution 
(‘law’, ‘cocktail party’) is merely a ‘placeholder for the linguistic articulation of 
all [the] practices’ that perform the function(s) that the status is supposed to 
accomplish.19 The self-definition of these statuses is not a problem precisely 
because the name of the status is simply standing in for the normative 
alterations that are supposed to be effected by the creation of the institution or 
the application of the institution to a new instance. When it happens formally, 
                                       
19 Ibid 52-53. 
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as it does in legal situations, the processes and normative implications of that 
status are set out in prior formal rules that must be followed for new instances 
to be institutionally recognized.  
 
So we now have a more complete picture of how the metaphysics of law 
answers the problem of explaining law’s normativity when we understand law 
to be a species of social fact. The mere descriptive facts of what some people do 
in Washington have normative implications because those people are ‘officials’ 
within legal institutions, their statuses and thus their deontic powers specified 
and defined by those institutions. When they act in their official capacities, 
they are making changes to those institutions, which then has normative 
implications for those subject to those institutions. 
While it will always be a separate question whether people supposedly 
subject to those institutions should pay any attention to how its officials claim 
to alter their normative space, what gets them into the zone of danger for such 
a normative change is that institutions are kinds of artefacts (albeit abstract 
ones). As such they are special kinds of tools that signal their functionality to 
those who interact with them. That signaling carries at least the basic 
normative demand that we recognize the artefact for what it is in terms of what 
it is supposed to do. In this case, the function of the artefact is itself to create 
and alter norms.  
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There are two kinds of normativity at play here. Seeing law as a kind of 
artefact bundles the most basic kind of normativity into the otherwise 
descriptive picture. That is a norm formed by the communicated intention of 
the artefact creator that we see the creation as a member of a specific kind. In 
this case, it is merely that we recognize what those guys in Washington did in 
1954 was to create a law, even if we eventually decide not to follow it. We can 
decide not to use our nutcracker to crack nuts (or even use it as a doorstop), 
yet we don’t stop understanding it to be a nutcracker. So even if we decide not 
to follow the law, we still recognize it as a law and that it was supposed to alter 
our rights and responsibilities. This is what makes it possible to draw 
normative conclusions from otherwise descriptive premises. The communicated 
intention of the artefact creator is a normative demand bundled with those 
premises.  
The other kind of normativity is the particular demands of the law itself, 
understood as an instance of a formal institution. Within the institutional 
ambit, those norms are binding insofar as they are valid. Whether those norms 
are robustly binding in a wider sense depends on whether those addressed by 
the norms have good reasons to be bound by the institution and what it is 
doing. That is the particular question of whether one should follow that law 
and depends for its answer on whatever justifies the law’s authority on that 
point. 
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So what we add with P4, that the actions undertaken by those guys in 
Washington constituted a law, is a norm that we recognize what they did as 
law and as potentially having normative implications for everyone described 
within the ambit of that institution. This doesn’t entitle us to say that the 
argument is valid in that the conclusion could still be false even when the 
premises are true. But it does explain why that normative conclusion could 
possibly be true even though the premises are otherwise merely descriptive. 
